Why do humans have instincts

It is small wonder, then, that the upholders of the physiological view fail to observe that the human individual merely passes through the stage of animal conduct just as he passes through the stage of simpler structural developments, and that the mature person is equipped with an entirely different series of reaction patterns than the animal or child.

And so we find that, contrary to our expectation, the fact that the complete absence of instincts in the human individual forces us to resort to animal behavior in order to study them, does not influence the biological abstractionist to reflect upon the differences in the two kinds of behavior, but instead he is led to interpret human conduct in the same abstract terms as the simpler kinds of behavior.

Incidentally, the failure to distinguish between the instinctive conduct of man and the instincts of animals results in the ascription of a degree of intelligence to animal conduct which is really not found there. Probably the most serious defect of biological abstractionism is that it obscures the extremely dynamic character of human behavior.

The principle of rigid neural functions is entirely inapplicable to the spontaneous and developmental aspects of our conduct, and favors the neglect of the stimulating circumstances which greatly modify it. Psychological Simplification. As represented by McDougall and his followers, this view stands as a justifiable criticism of physiological abstractionism, but in its espousal of the subjective position as over against the objective, that is to say, the position of action and behavior, [55] it is hindered from interpreting instinctive conduct as it actually functions.

Psychologists who are influenced by this viewpoint are unable to depart from a structural or content description of human behavior; they are prevented from conceiving of the complex non-rational conduct of man as the product of an intricate give and take. When such complex behavior is interpreted as an empirical consequent of numerous human conditions, we can readily see that religious conduct [56] cannot be 'a very complex and diversified product of the cooperation of several instincts,' that is to say, a 'compound' of simpler emotions.

To describe religious behavior as the manifestation of a complication of simple mental elements is to forego the scientific advantage of observing the ramified interaction of persons with their surrounding political, economic and cultural institutions.

The unwarranted simplification of human behavior means that instead of analyzing the social process in which are developed the deep-seated action patterns, the latter are gratuitously assumed as permanent elements of human character. The situation is not at all improved by asserting that complex 'impulses' are developed from simple 'impulses. A functional viewpoint of behavior, we submit, avoids completely the three insidious tendencies which we have just examined.

Since the functional psychologist assumes the data of psychology to be concrete adaptational responses to surrounding things, he can whole heartedly reject all putative powers and elements, and confine his labors to the analysis of verifiable materials, such as human reaction systems are. Abiding by such a policy, a psychologist is ipso facto barred from an impatient out of hand solution of difficult problems.

Especially in the matter of instinctive conduct, a functional viewpoint may lead to a scientific and significant, if tentative interpretation of an important series of psychological adaptations. The original published version of this document is in the public domain.

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Permission is granted for inclusion of the electronic text of these pages, and their related images in any index that provides free access to its listed documents. A Functional Interpretation of Human Instincts Jacob Robert Kantor University of Chicago Recent developments in the study of human behavior make it possible to begin a reinterpretation of instincts and related phenomena which today admittedly constitute the darkest chapter in psychology.

I The Nature of an Instinct. It is this moulding of the response by the surrounding con- 51 -ditions which is the source of the many marvellous tales of intelligence among the lower animals. When 53 we recall that a single individual can serve both as stimulating and responding object we can appreciate the importance of this self-stimulation as a factor in the rapid integration of the simpler forms of behavior.

Further, it has been frequently observed that instincts involve a much larger conscious function than is the case with reflexes, [5] since the latter are on the whole much simpler, 54 but we must guard against the idea that reflexes are merely neuro-muscular actions.

In a general way, we may very properly consider 55 the simplest instinctive behavior as called out by the environment, and largely controlled by it, and not by the organism. Human conduct is infinitely more complex in every 59 phase of adaptational character than can be accounted for on the basis of the combination of neural elements. In all cases of actual instinctive behavior the 'end' is gratuitously imposed upon 61 the situation.

Consequently, his interpretation leaves unfulfilled 62 his original functional promise, and ignores therefore one of the extremely important factors in conscious behavior, namely, the stimulating circumstances. Thus for example, to insist upon instincts as the exclusive springs of action is to lose sight of 63 the actual fact that many human actions are in a genuine sense rationally motived. For note, he allows for so much development in 64 the dispositions that he almost gives up the idea that the springs of human actions are innate.

Not only will a fear situation in any of these cases call out different sorts of 65 responses in the individual, but it may call out the same sort as an anger situation. This is familiarly illustrated in the case of the complicated social and institu- 66 -tional circumstances which are reduced to a few simple activities of the 'economic man.

When we take concrete 67 human behavior to be the province of psychology we are very soon impressed with the fact that instincts are necessarily specific in their functioning, but that the adult individual has no instincts. IV Relation of Instincts and Emotion. In this illustration, the simple instinctive, danger-avoiding response might appear, as the 69 most serviceable form of behavior under the circumstances.

V In conclusion we might point out three cognate obstructive tendencies, which persistently hinder psychological thinking concerning instincts, and which prevent the scientific interpretation of instinctive behavior, namely 1 metapsychological speculation, 2 biological abstractionism, and 3 psychological simplification.

As a consequence this comparatively simple behavior is resolved into hypothetical neural elements which can in no way account for so conspicuous a variation as the rapid development of human instincts into intelligent conduct, and the practically stationary condition of the 71 animal instincts. Psychologists who are influenced by this viewpoint are unable to depart from a structural or content description of human behavior; they are prevented from conceiving of the complex non-rational conduct of man as the product of an intricate give and take 72 process between persons and the social institutions which constitute their milieu.

Notes A reaction system is a complex function involving cognitive, conative, affective, muscular, glandular and neural factors. Kantor, 'Conscious Behavior and the Abnormal,' J. An example of a reaction system is the response, 'August, ' with all its accompanying organic resonances to the stimulation, 'when did the hostilities of the great European War begin? These are usually described by the zoologist as irritability, metabolism, reproduction, motility, etc.

Stout, 'Manual of Psychology,' , p. Stout, Brit. Stout's separation of the conscious and movement components of a response clearly exemplifies the difference between his position and a functional viewpoint. Our interpretation of Stout's position is in no wise invalidated by his reluctant inclination, expressed in the third edition of his 'Manual' p. Of Psychol. McDougall, Brit. Educational Psychol. James 'Principles,' II. It is unfortunate that psychologists appear to overlook the fact that constructive biologists do not think in terms of isolated nerve functions, but in terms of neuro-musculo-glandular systems.

In this connection it appears that if Thorndike has avoided 'mystic potencies' ' Educ. Psychol, ' p. In this connection it is extremely edifying to observe the highly moral ends that are sometimes imposed upon the instincts, such as 'heavy and unremitting toil on behalf of the offspring' in the case of the parental instinct. McDougall, 'Soc. Excluding the reflexes, of course. As a series of physiological mechanisms. Psychol, p. It seems clear that McDougall does not hold that the enduring condition of an instinctive act is a definite potential reaction system, that is to say, a concrete response pattern which will function when stimulated.

Drever, op. In the same sense as the foetal structure which is the foundation for the adult physique is integrated in the course of development. Such as are found in Veblen, 'The Leisure Class,' etc. Conative tendency—cf. The writer wonders whether McDougall considers the instincts as such absolute springs of action that they function either as determining the ends of all acaions or merely by being suppressed.

McDougall's discussion of the parental instincts, 'Soc. Woodworth, 'Dynamic Psychol. Shand, 'The Foundation of Character,' p.. Not the diffused feelings. Represented in psychology today by McDougall and Drever, who stand in the von Hartmann-Bergson line of development, cf.

So that the success of 'a politician or business man is attributed to the presence of political or business instincts, the desire of a nation to govern itself to the functioning of a self-governing instinct, and the building of cities to the presence of a gregarious instinct. Morgan, Brit. Or religious emotion, cf. McDougall, ' Soc. Psycho '. Fair Use Statement: Scholars are permitted to reproduce this material for personal use.

A perusal of our list brings at once to notice the union of instinct and emotion. A part of the terms apply primarily to acts, and so connect themselves with the common implication of the term instinct; whereas the other part suggests much more immediately the conscious feelings characteristic of the several forms of emotional experience.

Imitation, play, and constructiveness are examples of the first kind of term; fear, anger, and jealousy illustrate the second. A few comments upon each of the instincts mentioned may serve to emphasise helpfully the typical conditions under which they. It only remains to notice that in little children, despite some irregularity in different individuals, the normal provocatives are represented by strange objects, frequently by fur, by strange places, and especially by strange people, by being left alone, by darkness, and even occasionally by black objects; and by noises, particularly if very loud and unfamiliar.

In later life, in addition to the fear which arises from the presence of actually dangerous situations, such as the menace of a great conflagration, many persons are seized with dizziness and a more or less acute terror upon finding themselves on a very high place, even though the possibility of falling over is efficiently precluded by railings, etc. Others are frightened by anything which verges upon the supernatural. Even the cold-blooded materialist of polite fiction feels his unsentimental blood curdle just a bit at the rehearsal of a thrilling ghost story, and only the possessor of practiced nerves can be alone on a dark night in a cemetery, or a thick wood, without some " creepiness " of the hair and skin.

All of us are likely to find that in the midst of a violent tempest, whether on land or sea, the howling of the wind is a distinct source of mental anxiety quite disproportionate to our sober, intellectual apprehension of its real danger. All these things take hold of our racial instincts, and however vigorously our individual experience attempts through its cortical machinery to put a veto on such nonsense, our lower brain centres refuse to abandon their world-old habits, and accordingly we find that our hearts are beating wildly, our breathing coming in gulps, our limbs trembling, the while we look on, mortified at the weakness we cannot control.

We are irritated by the tireless piano next door, exasperated by the teasing child, hurt and vexed by the social snub, angry at the open insult, and perhaps moved to enduring hatred by the obnoxious and unscrupulous enemy.

There is a common emotional vein running through all these conditions however much the particular momentary expression may vary. Possibly resentment is the best name wherewith to label this common factor. The instinctive nature of the motor reactions requires no further demonstration than is furnished by the sight of any little child enjoying a tantrum.

The explicitly pugnacious element is, under civilised surroundings, inconspicuous after childhood is passed, despite the tremendous virility it displays if the curb be once slackened. The evolution of the race has been notoriously sanguinary, and we should feel no surprise, however much of disgust and regret we may entertain, that under the excitement of actual combat the old brute should display the cloven hoof.

The development of so-called civilised codes of war affords interesting instances of the effort rational man makes to clothe with decency the shame of his own brutishness. According to the code, women and children may not be slaughtered, but it is occasionally lawful to despoil them of their flocks and herds, to lay waste their grain, and even to burn the roofs above their heads. Shyness and Sociability. Sociability is simply an expression of the essentially gregarious nature of man.

Some men seem destined for membership in a very small herd,-- two or three at most,-others find their most natural surroundings amid large numbers. But the man or child who in one form or another does not natively crave. Many turn from life and such companions as they chance to have attracted with horror and disgust, seeking in God or in some ideal of their own imagination a companionship which shall be fit and satisfying.

But what is such a turning other than the most pathetic ap. No, sociability, under whatever limitations, is an expression of the very essence of humanity, and every little child evinces it by shunning solitude.

What often passes with children for a love of solitude is really more truly referable to the operation of the contrary instinct of shyness. In the very nature of the case the two impulses must always have been in unstable equilibrium so long as the drama of human life has been upon the boards.

A certain measure of suspicion toward the action and purposes of others must always have been a condition of avoiding harm and imposition. On the other hand, the race is fundamentally gregarious, and all its greatest achievements have come about through cooperative undertakings in which the solidarity of the social structure has been a sine qua non. The tension between these two instincts, which we often find existing in ourselves, is no mere idiosyncrasy of our own purely personal organisation.

It is rather a replica in us of a conflict which has been a part of the experience of every sane human being that ever lived. Sociability finds everywhere its natural expression in smiling and in bodily attitudes, or gestures, which are, perhaps, best described as obviously non-pugnacious. The secondary gestures, apart from smiling and laughing, are through imitation early overlaid with the conventional ceremonials of different races and peoples. But in babies we find general extensor movements of reaching and stretching out of the arms, with eyes wide open and gaze fixed, head erect, and often nodding.

In shyness the precise reverse is encountered. Strangers and persons feared or venerated are the normal stimulants to shyness. In both kinds of reaction the movements are observed before there can be any question of conscious imitation.

They are accordingly of undoubtedly instinctive nature. The great difficulty many persons experience in inhibiting the expressions of shyness also points to a similar conclusion. A special form of the generic tendency to sociability is found in childish affection for parent or nurse, and in the tender feelings in general which we cherish toward those of whom we are fond.

It finds its overt manifestation in facial expression, in modulation of voice, and in caressing gestures in general. The instinct is speedily veiled by experiential influences, but it gives every internal evidence of resting upon a native impulse, and its motor indices apparently require no artificial training. In childhood its common stimulus is found in persons upon whom we are dependent for our daily care.

It may even extend in a somewhat imperious fashion to toys and other possessions intimately associated with childish cosmology.

In mature life its stimulus is extremely complex, and baffles brevity of description. In general, it extends to all persons and possessions that we cherish as in some sort a part of ourselves. Curiosity and Secretiveness. Animals afford us abundant instances of curiosity, and many methods of hunting are designed to take advantage of this tendency.

Taken broadly, curiosity is simply another name for interest. In its simplest and most immediate form it is represented in the vertiginous. The child must pry about until he has fathomed the depths of your preoccupation.

If asked why he wishes to know what you are about, he could give you no rational answer, even if he would. He simply knows that he must find out what you are doing.

That is his feeling , and to ask for any deeper reason is itself unreasonable. The staid business man who allows himself to be lured across the street of a summer evening by the flaring torch of the street fakir has no reputable account to offer of his procedure. Time out of mind he has yielded to the same fascinating bait, always to find the same old bogus gold watches, the same improbable jewelry, the same nauseous medicines, passing out into the capacious maw of the great gullible public.

Curiosity is the racial instinct to which our sedate citizen is yielding, and that is all there is to the matter. In this simple form the motor expression is found in the alert and wide-open eyes, the parted lips, the attentive ear, the general attitude of readiness to react to any lead.

In its more intellectual phases we shall consider it under the head-of interest in a later chapter. Secretiveness will by many readers be thought unwarrantedly introduced as an instinct. It is not usually of sufficient consequence to justify any extended defence of its instinctive nature. But as a special form of shyness, at least, it deserves a word.

It seems to be a development of those instincts among animals which lead them to render themselves as inconspicuous as possible. Certain insects and birds frequent haunts in which the surroundings, whether vegetation or earth, are of a colour similar to their own.

In a corresponding fashion many persons feel an ineradicable impulse to conceal their plans, their actions, and their character behind a screen of non-committal silence and reserve. The impulse has no necessary connection with the preservation of a consciously defined personal dignity. It extends quite as forcefully to the suppression of all publicity touching the. Taciturnity is its commonest expression-if this formulation be not itself a paradox. Its irrational impulsive character is the mark which stamps it instinctive.

Many of us are at times secretive of fixed and consciously recognised design. And the reason for that is that the heavier elements that make life possible were themselves forged in the fires of stars.

So we are literally part of that, we are materially part of the cosmos. But what makes us different is that we are a part of the cosmos that is conscious and aware. So in human beings, the universe has become conscious of itself. We are in effect the universe waking up. DN: I want to ask you about another controversial topic: evolutionary psychology. In your view, is evolutionary psychology inherently flawed? Or is there a version of evolutionary psychology that can help us better understand human behavior or the evolution of the human mind?

KM: Evolutionary psychology is not an inherently flawed field, and it can tell us really important things. The most compelling example of this has to do with infanticide, which is the killing of young babies by their parents, typically by fathers or stepfathers.

Williams described a particular kind of monkey living in India where the social structure is harem based. There is a single male who is the harem master for a few less than a dozen females, and he impregnates all of them, and they all have these babies and so forth.

When a new male takes over the harem, he systematically kills the young children of all the females. As soon as he kills their babies, they go into estrus, he mates with them, and then he fathers his own children with them. Now what G. They then display their love for their babies murderer by bearing new children for him.

The studies have been done in several countries, including the U. A hundred and twenty times. That fits with G. The actual number of infanticides in the Canadian study was per one million stepchildren. That equals one in 2, More than times out of 1,, that stepfather is quite likely a loving, nurturing, and affectionate parent. I think the answer there is very simple. In terms of human behavior, we all do inherit certain biological predispositions to behavior that can be shaped by evolution.

But the reason the rate of murder vanishes into almost insignificance is because we humans grow up in a culture, and culture is powerful.

That culture is basically to raise young men—not always successfully, I will admit—with a reverence for life, for children, and with a necessity to respect the lives of other human beings.

So evolutionary psychology can tell us a great deal about the inherent drives that natural selection has wired into us. But every now and then, evolutionary psychology pretends to be the only reason why we behave the way in which we do. To pretend that evolutionary psychology can give us a complete explanation of all of humanities and social sciences is, I think, an example of overreach. Dutton was an Australian art critic who argued that the making of art could be explained as an example of sexual selection.

He noted that most artists historically have been male and argued that people make art in order to impress the girls and to increase their opportunities for mating.

Sexual selection is a real thing. No biologist would argue otherwise. But to take—as some writers have—not just art but also music and literature and to try to use them as examples of sexual selection to explain why males dominate those professions?

I think women are funny and some of my favorite comedians are female. I think people overlook the fact that we all grow up in a society this is the way I referred to the issue of infanticide as well. But those societies have been male dominated and have historically assigned gender roles. But please try to explain to me why we regard Picasso as a great artist. To convince people, is it necessary to polish the ego of certain religious believers in order to make evolution more palatable to them?

When I speak to religious audiences, particularly Christian audiences, the way I put it is very simple. I simply say, Look, the first duty of any Christian is to the truth. I think you understand that as a Christian.